












Seems he a dove? his feathers are but borrowed,
For he's disposed as the hateful raven:
Is he a lamb? his skin is surely lent him,
For he's inclined as is the ravenous wolf.
Who cannot steal a shape that means deceit? 

- Queen Margaret, in William Shakespeare, Henry VI, Part 2


In Part 2 of Shakespeare's Henry VI, the eponymous protagonist is cautioned against believing the semblance of peace and loyalty offered by his uncle and advisor, the Duke of Gloucester.  This extract encapsulates the known potential for individuals to actively perform – to 'borrow' characteristic traits of a disposition or morality – in order to achieve ends that are beneficial primarily to themselves rather than those they are interacting with.  The implications of Queen Margaret's warnings to Henry are that semblances of peace cannot be trusted, but should instead be interpreted as potentially artificial, and scrutinised for their enactors' potential personal gains.  This provides an illustrative example of the way that performance and masquerade underpin international politics.  

The character of the Conscientious Objector seems particularly apt to the topic of war masquerade, due to the way that these individuals are compelled to perform for others in order to prove their moral sincerity.  Conscientious Objectors engage in a struggle of social masks, in which they don the masks already crafted by both legal and cultural frameworks.  This can result in a performative struggle to prove that the mask one portrays is natural and exemplary of a CO's 'true' self.  Importantly, this negotiation of masquerade is often conducted in an effort to instantiate an alternative mode of international relations, in which violence and killing are consciously eschewed.  By comparing the masquerades of conscientious objection across the United States and United Kingdom, we can better understand the extent that these performances are shaped by political and cultural forces.  

In addition, this chapter unpacks the notion of masquerade through an application of performance theory.  This approach shares common ground with more familiar theories from sociology and feminist IR.  It differs by suggesting a more fully developed dramaturgical approach that includes broader aspects of theatricality and performative affect.  Specifically, I suggest that the performances of Conscientious Objectors exemplify the way that political masquerades can be haunted by the theatricality of the political repertoire.  Ultimately, I explore the notion that, in their efforts to put forward convincing embodiments of pacifism within the strict confines of military regulations and national traditions, the social masks donned by COs  may be 'feathers [that are] are but borrowed'.  

The chapter begins with a brief summary of my theoretical approach, in order to establish the general remit of a performative political analysis.  Following this I explore the historical roots of masquerade, to highlight some key points regarding the affective impact of political masks.  The next section introduces some key Conscientious Objector characters from the War on Terror, before providing a dramaturgical overview of the cultural and legal masks that regulate conscientious objection.  Finally I draw together some observations from CO enactments in both countries, in order to raise some difficult questions about the political efficacy of conscientious objection performances.   

Performance Theory and Politics
As an interdisciplinary Theatre-and-Politics analysis, this chapter brings theories of performance squarely into the realm of IR.  It attempts to apply theories of drama and theatre in a fashion that stretches beyond abstracted metaphors, clearly elucidating the performative nature of political interactions through rigorous arts-based knowledge.  In this sense it is conceived in solidarity with the work of other scholars who seek to bring the Arts into the Social Sciences in a thorough and sustained manner.  While Plato sought to ban playwrights and poets from his Republic, so too would many present-day IR scholars seek to firmly close the disciplinary gates against creative, embodied, theatrical knowledge.  However, we need look no further than Christine Sylvester's own calls for IR to avoid undermining arts-based methodologies in order to ascertain the present relevance and value of this kind of work. (Sylvester 2013)  

While I have elsewhere touched upon the interdisciplinary use of performance theory to international politics (Rowe 2013), the approach is sufficiently uncommon in IR to warrant a few preliminary remarks in order to avoid confusion.  Attempts to introduce performance to IR must often confront existing theories that are more familiar to Social Scientists.  In the first instance, scholars frequently confuse references to the performative with the usage of this term by J.L. Austin, John Searle, Jacques Derrida and Judith Butler.  While there is some overlap between performance theory and the above theorists' takes on 'performativity', these ideas are only one potential application of 'performance' to political interaction. .  It is helpful to remember that Austin himself was somewhat ambivalent about his own terminology, initially using the term 'performatory' to connote his idea of the utterance-that-creates-what-it-names. (Fischer-Lichte 2008, 33)  Had he stuck with his initial instinct we might have inherited less obfuscation when attempting interdisciplinary applications of performance to politics.  As it is, we must approach uses of these terms with caution. Herein, I deliberately reclaim the term 'performative' to refer to the broad performance-like characteristics of particular actions and modes of being, and this is, except where noted, distinct from linguistic notions of performativity. 

Another potential source of consternation arises from the shared attention to sociological theories of social drama, equally evident in both disciplines.  Approaches that embrace this application of performance are perhaps most commonly derived from Erving Goffman.  Despite the widespread acceptance of Goffman’s dramaturgical analysis, attempts to draw attention to the substantive theatricality of politics are often met with skepticism.  In my view social dramaturgical approaches to IR persuasively invite further applications of knowledge from the fields of drama and theatre, and it is this approach that I aim to illustrate below.  With this in mind, I want to begin my analysis by situating my understanding of 'masquerade' in a context informed by theatrical history and practice.   


A DRAMATURGY OF MASQUERADE AND MASKS
As this book will no doubt demonstrate, the idea of War Masquerades can be interpreted in widely divergent ways.  This enables a rich tapestry of interpretations of the term, and some creative freedom as a scholar to locate those elements of the concept that are most relevant to one's own interests.  As a Theatre and Performance scholar, my understanding of the term is derived from the history of both masquerade and masks, as two interlinking aspects of theatricality.  In this section I will offer one possible dramaturgy of masquerade, as it might apply to contemporary political performance.  First, I will conduct a brief inquiry into the historical roots of masquerade proper, and in particular its historical emergence vis-à-vis Italian Renaissance drama.  This to my mind reveals something about the potential ontological stakes of political masquerade.  Subsequently, I touch upon the long history of masks as objects in performance, and discuss some of the ways that their traditional uses have informed more recent theatrical experimentations.

Historical Masquerade
The etymology of 'masquerade' is quite revealing when considering applications of the term to politics.  Some sources suggest that the word evolved in the late 1500s, alongside the popularisation of masquerade balls, to denote a group of people in masks, after the Italian term maschera.  This latter term has its own roots in the term for 'mask', uniting notions of masquerade performances with the physical objects used to create them. (Murray and Burchfield 1933; Skeat 1980) While the etymology of both 'masquerade' and 'mask' cannot be definitively accounted for, the evolution of both words is saturated with historical perspectives on issues of representation and mimesis, as is revealed by noting the parallel history of performance at the time of its emergence.  

Theatre-making in 16th century Italy was marked by significant innovations that hinged on attitudes toward truth and falsity.  Italian Renaissance drama celebrated a return to Classical texts, including Aristotle's Poetics. (Andews 2006) This was accompanied by an emphasis on truthful portrayals of characters and situations, perhaps derived from Aristotle's celebration of mimetic authenticity and the moral education of audiences. (Aristotle trans. 1995)  Truth and artifice were conceived in a dichotomous relationship, and plays often explored themes of reality versus deceit.  On the stage itself, perspective painting added a sense of realism to theatrical scenery.  Play texts were constructed that portrayed each character in a way that was considered appropriate to and representative of his or her gender and social class.  Plots depicted the triumph of the forces of good and the downfall of evil.  In eliminating the chorus and soliloquy - which historically provided alternative viewpoints and commentary - Italian Renaissance drama more narrowly restricted audience interpretation.  It is perhaps no coincidence that this body of theatre also aimed to teach its audience moral lessons. (Andews 2006) What this suggests for the notion of political masquerade is that it may be somehow related to historical aesthetic principles that celebrated discrete binary degrees of authenticity.  In a analogous manner, we will see below how present-day military and judicial authorities attempt to narrowly restrict characters, behaviours, and plots; conscientious objectors are presented with specific established masks that they are required to wear authentically in order to convey their credibility and commitment to established social roles.  

However, the history of 'masquerade' is not in any way limited to the universal truth-seeking tendencies of Italian Renaissance drama.  Indeed, at the same time that Italian drama was earnestly seeking verisimilitude, other forms of performance began to celebrate overt artifice and performative deception.  Masquerade balls proper allowed participants to break strict moral and social rules and engage in interactions otherwise prohibited.  They developed in conjunction with the carnival festivities of Venice, in which Bakhtinian principles of the carnivalesque were manifestly present.  While initially an activity restricted primarily to the upper classes, by the Renaissance era carnival masquerades were becoming public festivities, in which a broad section of society participated. (Burke 1978; Castle 1986)  Here, participants donned masks in order to take on social identities normally prohibited by their class or gender, or to disguise themselves while committing socially inappropriate acts.  

Similarly, Commedia Dell'Arte, though based in a long tradition of recognisable and stereotyped characters, was popular for its wickedly subversive parodies.  Using stock character masks and following familiar plots recognisable to a linguistically diverse audience, Commedia troupes employed grotesquery, violence, bawdy humour, exaggerated gestures and acrobatic feats to entertain the masses.   Characters included the greedy rich man, the pompous military man, and the ignorant but prolifically pontificating academic. (Rudlin 1994)  Here, highly stylised performance rooted in overt, joyful artifice provided a platform for political satire. Importantly, Commedia plots often absorbed the content of familiar Italian tragedies, demonstrating the potential to subvert established characters and plots through humour and parody. (DiMaria 2013, 25)

These uses of physical masks stand in clear contrast to the realism pursued on the Italian Renaissance stage.  They offer insight into the potential of performance to craft alternative depictions of well-known social characters and plots, with the explicit purpose of mocking and subverting.  However, it would be risky to facilely associate these practices with political resistance, as it seems likely that the activities of institutionalised masquerades and carnival may simply have reified existing social categories.  While offering a temporary safety valve for the expression of imaginative and transgressive role-experimentation, they also continually referred to social and political norms, and were staged in a strictly temporary fashion. This underscores the difficulty of using masks in a truly resistant manner, as even seemingly subversive performances may inadvertently function to uphold the status quo.  To begin to uncover the true resistant potential of masquerade it is useful to briefly touch upon some of the ways that masks might theatrically create degrees of increaased political agency. 

To start with, the concept of the mask as primarily an obscuring device is relatively recent, dating to the 15th century. (Skeat 1980)  We can perhaps think about it more usefully in terms of its Greek and Roman theatrical roots, where it was termed prosopon and persona, respectively.  These words have a meaning that is closer to 'face' or 'person' than to a face covering. (Twycross and Carpenter 2002, 282) Significantly, historical masks were not necessarily used for parodies or exaggerations, but  were often intended to bring specific, recognisable elements of human nature to the fore. This suggests that we can think of masquerade as a choice to bring particular character elements to the attention of viewers, and downplay other less relevant aspects of ourselves in particular political circumstances.    

This raises the issue of the extent to which we may be actively able – or not – to choose which masks we wear and how.  While historical masks were not necessarily intended to deceive or manipulate, they were often used in a way that suggests their capacity to 'fix' characters into a hardened, difficult-to-escape social role.  When applied in ritualistic settings, masks signalled the essential traits of a particular role, and they confined their wearer to associated parameters of behavior as long as he or she continued to wear that mask. (Smith 1984)  This results in a degree of empowerment, as the mask is endowed with authority and sanctity. However, this empowerment is fully contingent on remaining firmly fixed to that mask alone.  This is particularly important with regard to political performance, because of the potential for quasi-ritualistic legal and political practices to legitimise or deligitimse personal behaviour though the application of particular masks. 

On the other hand, masks may also be used in a way that disrupts normal social patterns, and in fact their established character associations may prove fruitful in re-making modes of public perception and audience response.  Historically, Greek masks not only displayed characters, but  were also specially constructed in order to amplify the voices of the actors beneath them. (Twycross and Carpenter, 2002)  In this way masks were intended to give a louder, more noticeable voice to the characters they portrayed.  If we apply this to social actors who are traditionally marginalised from political processes, we can discern that the donning of particular masks might enable them to acheive a louder political 'voice', or political agency.  

Additionally, masks allow characterisation to move from body to body.  By overtly performing masquerades, political actors may reveal that fluidity of idenity is not only possible but commonplace.  As Susan Harris Smith notes, psychologists and anthropologists have underscored masks' abilities to free the wearer from social and cultural roles.  Masks can liberate performers and enable them to experience and express a range of behaviours and emotions that would otherwise not be available to them in the context of social and cultural strictures.  At the same time, they obscure the 'true' identity of the embodied actor beneath them, which can allow that actor to be critical of accepted modes of behaviour and the institutions that create and promulgate them. (Smith 1984, 2)

In the 20th century, Western theatre has experimented extensively with the use of masks, in order to ascertain their potential to create new modes of audience response and actor-spectator relationships.  At the forefront of evolving notions of selfhood, identity and society, theatre practitioners have put masks into motion in ways that instigate new modes of reception among the public.  When considering theatrical experiments with masking we might turn to theorist-practitioners like WB Yeats, Edward Gordon Craig, Luigi Pirandello, Jerzy Grotowski, Jacques Copeau, Jacques Lecoq, and innumberable others.  With this rich background, it is clear that masquerade might be deliberately conducted with an approach that uses masks to influence public perceptions and responses in particular ways.

Based on this history of masquerade and masking, we must first acknowledges that Conscientious Objectors must display a social mask that reveals the necessary traits of their social role while concealing unacceptable ones; this crafts a character that will more easily be deemed ‘authentic’ amidst singular truth-seeking political dramas.  In addition, the performative potential of masks discussed above - which might in other circumstances be used to instigate political change - is typically sidelined in favour of safeguarding a CO’s own physical, psychological and moral welfare. The reasons for this become clearer when looking at the legal and cultural frameworks that surround conscientious objection, and the practical restrictions they institute for those seeking this status.

One way that we might theorise Conscientious Objectors' masquerades in light of these restrictive fameworks is by considering the way that historical political performances have made particular masks available for modern day CO applicants.  This is an approach informed by theorists who explicate the relationship between present-day theatrical affect and performances of the past.  For example, for Marvin Carlson, present day performances are saturated with memories of past ones, and this 'memory-machine' plays an important part in the interpretation of actions by spectators.  Carlson uses the term 'ghosting' to denote the process of presenting audiences with an entity that they have encountered before, which although presented in a new context, calls upon their previous encounters in their interpretation of a present manifestation. (Carlson 2001, 7)  For CO performance, this means that any public claims to the status are influenced by public memories of conscientious objectors in prior conflicts.  In a similar way, Diana Taylor has written about the repertoiric function of performance, which creates a living, embodied archive.  Her work emphasizes the way that performers in the present learn to present a role through the repertoire of prior actors.  In Taylor and Carlson we have two theories of the lingering impact of historical performances on present-day enactments.  This suggests that CO performances should be analysed not only in their contemporary cultural or national contexts, but in their historical contexts as well. 


DRAMATIS PERSONAE OF CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION
Before continuing with an account of the legal and cultural environment of conscientious objection, I first want to introduce the main characters of this analysis, a selection of present day Conscientious Objectors.  I will refer back to these individuals in my analysis below, and here only provide a brief summary of their war experiences.

Joe Glenton was the first British soldier to refuse deployment to Afghanistan on the basis of Conscientious Objection.  Although he voluntarily joined the Royal Air Force, he experienced a change of heart during his first deployment to Kandahar in 2006.  As he became increasingly aware of the political complexities behind the War on Terror, and the indiscriminately violent nature of the warfare itself, Glenton became convinced that the conflict was morally wrong. (Glenton 2013) Although he initially inquired about conscientious objection, he was discouraged from this by his commanding officer and as a result he opted to flee to Australia instead.  He was ultimately sentenced to prison for a period of nine months, relating both to his AWOL status and – signficantly – to speaking out in the media against the war. (Graham 2011)

Michael Kendall Smith is a dual New Zealand and British citizen, who earned a medical degree in Australia and wrote a university thesis on the secular and rational morality of Kant. (News.bbc.co.uk 2014)  He subsequently joined the RAF in 2000 as a Commissioned Officer, serving as a doctor and completing two tours in Iraq.  His objection to the war stemmed from his understanding of international law, which led him to believe that the conflict was a ‘war of aggression’.  He refused a deployment to Basra in 2005 and was consequently sentenced to 8 months in prison. (Gulam and O’Connor 2006) 

Michael Lyons joined the Royal Navy at the age of 18.  He served as a Medic in a submarine unit and was ordered to deploy to Afghanistan in 2010.  He has stated that he was initially unsure about the morality of going to war, but felt a duty to serve his country.  After discovering details of the war published in Wikileaks documents, he became convinced that he couldn't morally participate in the conflict. (Lyons 2010) He applied for a discharge from the Navy on the basis of moral opposition to the War on Terror, but his application was ultimately rejected.  He was sentenced to seven months in prison for refusing orders to submit to weapons training. (Çınar 2013)

Perhaps the most well-known American Conscientious Objector of the War on Terror is Camilo Mejia.  Mejia joined the Army in 1994 at the age of 19, shortly after arriving in the United States as an immigrant from Nicaragua.  After three years of active service he joined the Florida National Guard and enrolled in university studies.  In 2003 his unit was called up in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, and under the Stop-Loss programme Mejia was obliged to deploy despite having only weeks of contractual service remaining. (Goldenberg 2004)  After serving in Iraq his already-ambivalent feelings about the military crystallised into outright opposition to the War on Terror.  Home on leave, he deserted when scheduled to redeploy, and was ultimately imprisoned.  From his prison cell he launched what would become a successful conscientious objection bid. (Mejia 2007) 

Kimberly Rivera enlisted in the US Army in 2006 at the age of 24, in order to stem her family's growing financial difficulties.  She had two children at the time of volunteering, and after her first tour of duty in Iraq she became disillusioned by the brutality of the war and its indiscriminate impact on Iraqi civilians.  On leave in early 2007, she absconded to Canada when due to report back for a second tour of duty.  She was accompanied by her husband and children, and spent five years there before being forcibly deported to the United States, where she was court martialled and sentenced to ten months in prison. (Goodman 2013)

In July 2013, 22-year old US Army Private Christopher Munoz attempted to file for Conscientious Objector status just days before his unit was scheduled to depart for Afghanistan.  Munoz's case was complicated by the fact that he voluntarily enlisted in the Army in 2012, well after the start of the War on Terror. In weapons training he was informed that he must prepare himself to take the life of others, even children if necessary.  This confounded the young recruit, who developed a resulting moral objection to war in general. (Meola 2014)  He was reportedly threatened with violence from his fellow recruits and the public at large, but ultimately received an honourable discharge from the Army. (Briggs 2013; Meola 2014)


LEGAL AND CULTURAL MASKS OF CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION
While space limitations don't allow for a full account of the performance and spectatorship of conscientious objection, in this section I will explore some of the legal and cultural aspects that influence the kinds of masquerade that Conscientious Objectors are likely to perform.  This brief account highlights the extent to which performative verisimilitude is at the heart of judgements of conscientious objection claims.    

Legal Frameworks
I first want to discuss the legal regulations that impact the performances of would-be Conscientious Objectors.  Under this category I am considering the legal statutes and regulations that govern applications for the granting of Conscientious Objector status, as well as the established procedures relating to them.  These policies and their typical application vary signficantly between the two countries, although there are common themes in both.  

In the United States, conscientious objection has long been recognised as a valid avenue for those called up to serve in war.  John Whiteclay Chambers locates the origins of modern conscientious objection among the pacifist religious populations of the British North American colonies. (Chambers II 1993, 23) Since the founding of the country, states have individually made provisions for citizens to abstain from war violence on the basis of moral or religious beliefs.  These provisions varied by state until the early 20th century when national conscription created a need for federal legislation on the matter. (Churchill 1996, 101)  Since the start of military operations in the War on Terror, several hundred individuals have applied for Conscientious Objector status in the United States, with approximately half of applications being successful. (GAO 2007)  The provisions for conscientious objection are clearly acknowledged in both government and military documents.  The Universal Military Training and Service Act – which mandates registration for ‘selective service’ - states that, 
"Nothing contained in this title [...] shall be construed to require any person to be subject to combatant training and service in the armed forces of the United States who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form." (50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j)) 

Department of Defense Directive 1300.06 sets out the procedures that must be followed for Conscientious Objector applications.  Each branch of the military implements these principles according to their own regulations, but the basic principles must be adhered to by each. (Jurden 2005; US Department of Defense 2007)  All branches of the military require applications to be made in writing.  Applicants must provide documentary evidence to support their claim to a sincere, firm and deeply-held objection to all wars, and the belief system that it is based upon. They are subsequently interviewed by a military chaplain and a psychiatrist, whose reports go into the applicant's file. Following this initial application an informal hearing is held at which the applicant may speak and present evidence in support of their application – with the assistance of a lawyer if they have provided one for themselves. (Jurden 2005; Drylewski 2008) Should their initial application fail, applicants may then appeal through the federal judiciary.  Historically, the precise interpretation of the required standards for COs has varied.  However, the sincerity of the applicant has been consistently considered of utmost importance. (Drylewski 2008) As a result, the entire process hinges on the construction of a narrative that can convincingly demonstrate the appropriate character evolution.

One advantage that potential American Conscientious Objectors have over their British counterparts is the fact that the option of formally applying as a CO is widely known.  This is largely due to the memory of war resistance in the Vietnam era, and the associated Conscientious Objector (or 'draft dodger') figure in the popular imagination.  However, in spite of the widespread knowledge of the right to conscientious objection, few military enlistees are sufficiently aware of the formal procedures required to apply.  Kimberly Rivera is just one example of the many hundreds who have    felt it necessary to leave the United States to avoid participating in the war, in part due to a lack of information about conscientious objection. (Keen 2010; Goodman 2013) 
In comparison to the United States, there is less written legislation relating to conscientious objection in Britain.  The legal provisions are set out in three Acts of Parliament: The Military Service Act (2) of 1916; The National Service (Armed Forces) Act of 1939; and the National Service Act of 1948. (Harries-Jenkins 1993, 68)  Each branch of the armed forces has documents setting out their implementation of these legal principles, but they are not widely available to either military enlistees or the general public.  It was only in 2007 that thorough details were made available by the Ministry Of Defence, following a Freedom of Information Act request by War Resisters International. (War Resisters’ International 2007)  In general, the policies provide much less detail regarding the procedures to be followed for claims to conscientious objection, and the standards of legitimacy required.  However, the practical application of these provisions has been more restrictive than the written Acts may at first suggest.  A significant number of CO applicants have been unsuccessful in their appeals due to judges interpreting their cases in ways that seem to ignore the parliamentary provisions – basing their rulings on their individual sentiments about conscientious objection in the present day. (Çınar 2013, 35) This seems to mirror the situation in the United States, where the courts have arrived at signficantly contradictory interpretations of CO regulations across various cases. 

In order to apply for Conscientious Objector status, members of the British military may file a written request to their Commanding Officer, along with evidence from a chaplain or an equivalent source.  Alternatively, they may simply voice their initial bid to their commanding officer, and this seems to be the more common course of action.  This is significant, because if a would-be CO becomes discouraged from this initial interaction he or she is likely to be dissuaded from carrying their application further.  This was certainly the case for Joe Glenton, whose commanding officer labelled him a coward upon his first inquiry. (Glenton 2013, 73) Once made official, applications are reviewed by administrative bodies of the relevant branch of the forces, and if they are unsuccessful applicants can appeal to the Advisory Committee of Conscientious Objection. (MOD 2007)  This latter is an independent body, and the first opportunity for British applicants to have their cases reviewed by a dedicated non-military entity – an option typically not provided to applicants in the United States. (Graham 2011)

In contrast to their American counterparts, far fewer British military recruits are aware that conscientious objection is still allowed within the bounds of an all-volunteer military.  Tens of thousands of members of the British Armed Forces have gone Absent Without Leave since 2003, but as of 2011 only nine had formally applied as Conscientious Objectors. (Savage 2010; Marsden 2011)  It has been suggested that this paucity of CO applications may be linked to the lack of information provided from within the British forces.  Furthermore, in contrast to the United States, where the Vietnam War left a legacy of imagination with regard to conscientious objection, in the UK it is assumed to have become obsolete with the abolition of conscriptive military service. (Graham 2011)   

The legal documents and procedures discussed above provide the staging ground for masquerades of conscientious objection.  Within these though, there are several character traits that must be successfully performed in order to convince authorities of a CO's authenticity.  I have already mentioned the ‘sincerity’ that is required to be demonstrated by American COs.  Both countries’ regulations refer to sincerity or honesty, and these overlapping characteristics seem to be non-negotiable if Conscientious Objectors are to enact the masquerade successfully.  However, other characteristics are also required for the characters of conscientious objection to prove believable to military and judicial authorities.  

One of the most difficult aspects to negotiate relates to the motivations and inspirations that underpin each Conscientious Objector's characterisation.  Historically, conscientious objection was deemed to be valid only when it stemmed from institutional religious grounds.  However, over the course of the 20th century rules have evolved to allow for moral objections that stem from a broader range of belief systems. (Moskos and Chambers II 1993)  From 1970, the US federal government softened existing regulations so that conscientious Objection would be considered legitimate even if rooted in moral beliefs rather than religious ones. (Drylewski 2008, 1449)  In the present day a large number of conscientious objection applications are approved on non-religious grounds.  For example, Chris Munoz asserted that his conscience was pricked by the combat training he received, and that this made him aware of a deeply held, but non-religious objection to war violence. (Meola 2014)  In the UK, while the source of conscientious objection is not formally delimited, this is not always adhered to in practice.  Michael Lyons' case demonstrates the difficulties faced by individuals who wish to file for Conscientious Objection on the basis of non-religious opposition.  When he filed his initial claim, he was referred to a Navy chaplain in line with the procedures discussed above.  While the Army and RAF allow political objectors to provide references from non-religious sources, the Navy does not allow for this exception.  Following his interview with a Navy chaplain, Lyons was characterised as someone with political reservations about the conflict but no discernible moral objection. (Graham 2011)  This seems to conflict with the Ministry of Defence’s outline of procedures, which refers only to the ‘genuine’ nature of Conscientious Objectors. (MOD 2007)

Both countries have grappled with the evolution of conscientious objection since it has shifted from primarily religious motivations to secularly-derived ones, not least because it seems to exacerbate the issue of selectivity.  Where conscientious objection becomes allowable on non-religious grounds, it seems that the door is opened for moral objections that might be based on relative opposition to particular wars.  This creates a greater urgency for the Armed Forces to develop criteria for assessing the nature of moral objections to war.  This is particularly evidenced in efforts to ban so-called ‘political’ beliefs from the realm of moral objection.  For example, in the United States, beliefs that are deemed to be based on philosophical, sociological or political reasonings remain explicitly illegitimate justifications according to the Supreme Court. (Churchill 1996, 102) The Universal Military Training and Service Act, after establishing the right to conscientious objection quoted above, states that:
"As used in this subsection, the term “religious training and belief” does not include essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views, or a merely personal moral code." (50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j)) 
This is problematic, not only due to the restrictions placed on would-be COs, but also because it seems to suggest that philosophy, sociology and politics are somehow illegitimate as the basis of belief systems – raising the quesiton of where non-religious beliefs might stem from, and indeed seeming to indicate that politics and morality are distinctly separate and independent spheres.  It is also troubling because it effectively precludes would-be conscientious objectors from speaking out against the war they have been ordered to participate in.  Any acts deemed to be political protest can thwart a potential Conscientious Objector by enabling authorities to refute their CO claims by characterising them as protesters or activists.  This sets up a contest of masquerades, in which the CO applicant must apparently wear a mask of political, philosophical and sociological naïveté.  

In contrast to the United States, the UK does in theory allow selective Conscientious Objection.  However, as Özgür Heval Çınar notes, several recent cases have resulted in judges or commanding officers rejecting an application for conscientious objection specifically on the basis of its political motivations.  Joe Glenton, Michael Lyons and Maclom Kendall Smith all attempted to base their conscientious objection on the belief that the conflict in Afghanistan was part of an illegal war.  All three of their cases were unsuccessful and resulted in prison sentences. (Çınar 2013)  Michael Lyons' bid for CO status was based explicitly on his objection to a particular war.  However, in this case the court ruled against the conscientious objector, with direct reference to his voluntary enlistment in the Navy and the potential risk that might be posed to the public and the military in general, should sudden changes of heart about service be condoned. (English 2011)  In the case of Malcom Kendall Smith who spoke of war crimes committed by American forces in Basra, the judge stated,
"Obedience of orders is at the heart of any disciplined force.  Refusal to obey orders means the force is not a disciplined force but a rabble.  Those who wear the Queen's uniform cannot pick and choose which orders they will obey.  Those who seek to do so must face serious consequences." (Judge Advocate Jack Bayliss, in Sengupta 2006)
In this case, the judge clearly conflated a political objection to a war with an objection to a single particular order, and ruled in opposition to the principles seemingly set out by the Ministry of Defence.  This demonstrates the extent to which the legal regulations alone are not sufficient for the establishment of a conscientious objection claim; clearly there is more at work here than the law.  It suggests that perceptions of conscientious objection can become fixed in the popular imagination in ways that directly counter the legal provisions, and these are brought to bear on interpretations of present-day cases.  This underscores the necessity for performance, particularly through subversive masquerade, to attempt to impinge upon these mindsets.  

Another result of the so-called voluntary nature of the War on Terror is that present day COs must answer challenges to their claims based on the duration of their beliefs.  In 1995, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights formally proclaimed that conscientious objection to war and violence may develop over the course of participation in warfare, and need not be a lifelong sentiment.  (UNHCR 1995).  Despite this, the American laws in particular continue to require moral objections to stem from long-standing beliefs.  In fact, the standards required on this point have grown increasingly stringent.  For example, in June 2013 the United States Navy overhauled their longstanding regulations regarding Conscientious Objector status, raising the threshold for applicants.  The new regulations specify that a CO's convictions must be firm and 'fixed', suggesting that changes of heart will not be considered sufficient grounds. (Galvin 2013)  In other words, masks of American Conscientious Objection cannot be donned spontaneously, but must be shown to be natural to the body behind them.  

This requirement for Conscientious Objectors to attest to the long-standing nature of their opposition to war, rather than opposition to a particular war, proves a difficult obstacle for some.  The threshold is particularly high here, and it is difficult to convince not only the legal authorities, but also the public of the sincerity of emergent rejections of war.  This was demonstrated in some of the responses to Kimberly Rivera's case.  One commentator, while acknowledging the moral validity of some earlier War on Terror CO applications, critiqued Rivera as follows:

"Rivera enlisted in 2006. Sept. 11 was five years in the past. Everyone but the most fervent Republican conspiracy theorist had acknowledged that the war was based on faulty intelligence and that Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction or the means to produce them. The Iraqi civil war was raging, and U.S. military forces there were losing dozens of soldiers each month trying to hold the country together.  Rivera knew what she was getting into, and signed up anyway. She did so for a simple reason: She needed the money that the Army was offering. She made a calculated decision for financial reasons, and when she decided she didn’t like the deal she’d signed up for, abandoned her duty and fled the country." (Gurney 2013)




Alongside the legal frameworks that influence the construction of political masks, Conscientious Objectors are also subject to popular beliefs about the social role they wish to subscribe to.  In both the United States and United Kingdom, Conscientious Objection is accompanied by historical associations relating to its validity and morality.  These are perpetuated in popular culture, particularly via film and television, but also increasingly in broadcast news media and the online campaigning that results from high-profile CO cases.  As a broad description of conscientious objection in both countries, it is fair to say that CO's are faced with a choice between two social masks – the mask of a martyred hero and the mask of a deceitful coward.  Lois S. Bibbings has provided a thorough account of the characterisations of British First World War Conscientious Objectors, outlining how they were seen as either disgraceful cowards or patriotic national heroes. (Bibbings 2009)  These masks are no less evident in the present day.  They are constructed in tandem with views about foreign policy and elite decision-making, and there is rarely much neutral ground between the two options.  

The popular opinion of Conscientious Objection in the United States is undoubtedly coloured by the history of conscription during the Vietnam Era.  On one hand, some modern day COs may gain currency from the difficult experiences of earlier conscientious objectors.  They may refer to historical counterparts like Muhammed Ali, who sacrificed his World Heavyweight title and risked imprisonment in 1967 by refusing to participate in the Vietnam War.  Or, they may cite the 60,000-plus young men who fled to Canada or other countries to avoid being drafted into a war they disagreed with. (Cortright 2008, 165)  However, there is a tension here between a popular understanding of the Vietnam War as a generally immoral conflict, and the ongoing desire to honour the service of individuals who participated in spite of the political specificities.  To a certain extent the moral conundrums of the Vietnam War have heightened the sense of patriotic sacrifice attached to military service in the United States, as it has crystallised into a tradition of service-without-question, and a duty to endure wartime sacrifices without reflection, regret or remorse.  When present day recruits speak about the immorality of a current conflict, some interpret this as a broader charge against those individuals who failed to question the immorality of past wars. (Rowe 2013)  This is a clear case of the historical repertoire influencing public reception of political masquerades in the present.  It is perhaps not surprising that conscientious objectors have been branded 'traitors', 'cowards', and 'disgraces to the uniform' in online media and in interpersonal encounters.  

In contrast to the United States, the idea of Conscientious Objection in the UK most frequently conjures up associations with a more distant conflict, the First World War. The historical treatment of COs in this war, in which a widespread draft was instituted, is well-remembered in British popular culture.  Stories of the starvation and torture faced by imprisoned COs, and the public shaming of them and their families, have reached almost mythic status.  In 2014, the centenary of the First World War is bringing reminders of the war’s nature to the forefront of the public imagination – and it is proving to be more complex and contestable than perhaps expected.  Jeremy Paxman - the well-respected television host and investigative journalist - recently sparked a media uproar when he described First World War Conscientious Objectors as 'cranks'.  In February 2014, Paxman's remarks were broadcast during his documentary that commemorated the start of Britain's involvement in the war:
“It seems to me remarkable that a country which considered itself in the grip of a struggle for national survival nonetheless allowed individual citizens to decide whether they could reconcile that struggle with their personal conscience." (The Great War 2014)
He went on to ask the descendent of a First World War Conscientious Obector whether her ancestor may have perhaps just been being 'awkward'. (The Great War 2014) The media furore over Paxman's comments, while perhaps predictable, also reveals the strict coding of the masks of Conscientious Objection, and the extent to which the characterisations of these masks are hotly contested.  Despite this, at present in the UK the tendency to disparage would-be Conscientious Objectors seems to be no less apparent in the present day than it was in earlier conflicts.  Conscientious Objectors whose cases have attracted  media attention have found themselves branded with the same epithets as their First- and Second World War counterparts.  Called cowards, malingerers, and members of the 'White Feather Brigade', they are frequently maligned for their change of heart and opposition to war violence. (Glenton 2013, 109)  Clearly, it is not only the dove-like ‘feathers’ of pacifism that may in some fashion be ‘borrowed’ from the historical repertoire; equally, the characteristics and costuming used to malign them have their roots in the enactment of past wars.  

Increasingly, conscientious objectors in both countries are donning a third mask to address the problematic dramaturgy discussed above.  In efforts to confront the restrictive scripts of conscientious objection in the War on Terror, many individuals are crafting a character rooted in a narrative of victimhood or exploitation.  While this is similar to the mask of patriotic heroism mentioned above, it differs in an important way.  Here, the masks illustrate familiar themes on the American side.  War opponents point to the GI Bill and its practical function as an 'economic draft' targetting the poor; to the strategic use of video games and popular entertainments to entice vulnerable teens into military service; and to the ruthless tactics of recruiting offices that allegedly obscure the true nature of service contracts from new recruits. (e.g., Liberation News 2012; War Resisters League 2014; )  Much of this discourse is also discernible in British equivalents, with several organisations distributing materials that highlight the economic inequality of military recruits, and the lack of information given to prospective enlistees. (Forces Watch B; At Ease 2014)  In addition, attention has been drawn to the fact that the British forces recruit young men and women from the age of 16 – the only country in Europe to do so.  Indeed, there have been some suggestions that the British military is increasingly modelling its recruitment practices on American counterparts, developing websites and games to appeal to 12-17 year olds, and locating recruiting offices in areas of the country that are economically deprived. (Forces Watch A)

These depictions of military service seek to undermine the characterisation of the armed forces as a heroic and infallible entity.  They attempt to complicate and mulitply the available masks of military service, and reveal more nuanced and finely-detailed characters.  However, in doing so they risk reinforcing the established masks of conscientious objection that depict non-conforming individuals as victims of state power – a problematic I will refer back to below.  Perhaps one of the most illustrative responses of this kind comes from Camilo Mejia.  In a statement derived from his CO application, he says the following:
"To those who have called me a coward I say that they are wrong, and that without knowing it, they are also right. They are wrong when they think that I left the war for fear of being killed. I admit that fear was there, but there was also the fear of killing innocent people, the fear of putting myself in a position where to survive means to kill, there was the fear of losing my soul in the process of saving my body [...] I say without any pride that I did my job as a soldier. I commanded an infantry squad in combat and we never failed to accomplish our mission. But those who called me a coward, without knowing it, are also right. I was a coward not for leaving the war, but for having been a part of it in the first place. [...] I failed to fulfill my moral duty as a human being and instead I chose to fulfill my duty as a soldier. All because I was afraid. I was terrified; I did not want to stand up to the government and the army - I was afraid of punishment and humiliation." (Mejia 2007)
While this statement is refreshing in its attempts to escape the confines of the hero/coward dichotomy, it raises further issues by emphasising the disempowerment of military dissenters against the monolithic character of the military institution itself. This highlights one of the difficulties inherent to acts of conscientious objection, particularly if the actor wishes to pursue their anti-war stance through the subversion of related power structures. 

POSSIBILITIES FOR SUBVERSIVE MASQUERADES OF CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION
In the account above I have attempted to sketch out a brief dramaturgy of conscientious objection, in order to demonstrate the extent to which CO enactments are shaped by the existing social masks that surround them.  It must be acknowledged that the masquerades of Conscientious Objection are haunted by the high stakes that such performances entail; to succeed in donning an appropriate mask of conscientious objection means that the performer gains in legal, moral, and personal agency – to fail means to be forced into commiting acts one finds morally reprehensible, to put one's own body at risk for a cause one objects to, and to leave oneself and one's family vulnerable to the malignancy of popular opinion.  With this in mind, it is with caution that I proceed to suggest some of the ways that CO bids may provide an opportunity for masquerades that undermine the traditional masks of conscientious objection and their accompanying narrow social, moral and political codes.  

As established above, most CO applicants seek to use masks in a manner consistent with ritualistic masquerade.  Here, conscientious objectors seek to perform the established – ritualised – masks that might legitimise their claims for exceptional consideration under the law.  The mask here must remain primarily indiscernible from the human flesh beneath.  In this type of performance, the mask has the effect of subsuming the audience into the truth-world created by the performer, decreasing the gap between performer's portrayals and public interpretation.  However, by ‘sticking to the script’ in this fashion, they are effectively upholding the power structures that underpin war violence in the first place.  Robert Paul Churchill observes that: 

"The granting of CO status by various Selective Service Acts appears to be a major concession, given the state's traditional hostility to challenges to its right to use force.  In point of fact, however, by treating COs as exemptions, allowing for exceptional pietry and sectarian discipline, the state can avoid confronting any implicit challenge to its authority.  The state can grant freedom of conscience without conceding that the justice or morality of its policies are being challenged.  COs are thus seen as not condemning the state's war making, but only seeking personal exemption." (Churchill 1996, 101)

In other words, Conscientious Objectors may be inadvertently operating as the exception that proves the rule of sovereignty, to borrow from Giorgio Agamben's philosophy.  By granting COs an exceptional exemption from duty, the state simply acknowledges their personal inappropriateness for service while obscuring the unexplored challenge to its own morality.  

How might theatrical masquerade undo this conundrum?  As we have seen, masks may also be donned in an overtly theatricalised fashion.  In this way, audiences are continually reminded of the mask that the CO chooses to wear.  When worn with care, masks may creatively disturb audiences, reminding them of the constant performative nature of what they are viewing; further, by extension, these audiences may begin to develop a sense of theatrum mundi, and the ubiquity of performance amidst what they henceforth perceived as incontestable 'reality'.  The rich theatrical potential of masks may be easily applied to social drama in many contexts; but it must be acknowledged that it may prove impractical in the context of the urgent vulnerability faced by Conscientious Objectors.  However, I maintain that there are lessons to be gleaned from theatrical knowledge about the effect a CO bid might have on public audiences, and how this might impact public perceptions of war, violence and state power.  To highlight this potential I want to conclude with a description of two 'performances' by or about conscientious objectors.  The first is the ceremony held in Tavistock Square, London on International Conscientious Objectors Day, 2014.  The second is a more impromptu social performance, which although less deliberately theatrical, nonetheless held media audiences spellbound as it broadened the normal cast of characters.

On May 14th, 2014, the city of London marked International Conscientious Objectors Day with a ceremony held at Tavistock Square.  This event was held in parallel with ceremonies around the country, designed to commemorate the sacrifices of British COs in all wars.  It followed an expected pattern: audiences gathered at the designated spot at the advertised time, and listened to speakers who stood before a bank of media microphones and cameras.  Situated directly in front of the national memorial to Conscientious Objectors (erected in 1996), the speakers described the horrific sacrifices faced by COs of the First and Second World Wars.  Several of them were the direct descendents of Conscientious Objectors, and their stories were told with raw emotion.  References were also made to modern-day COs and the audience was reminded of the links between past and present.  A local school choir sang songs to honour the past heroes, and the ceremony concluded with a long list of descendents reading the names of their CO ancestors and laying photographs and flowers on the nearby monument.

This ceremony was highly poignant.  As a member of the audience I found the stories told by family members very moving, and the quasi-ritualistic honour roll lent a sense of gravitas and magnitude to the names that were called out.  However, I was also left with an eerie sense of the similarity to patriotic services of remembrance that I have witnessed in both Britain and the United States.  I left wondering to what extent this CO commemoration was simply employing the same theatrical techniques of emotional manipulation as the ones that seek to reinforce support for war and military sacrifice.  It was obviously well-intentioned as a counterbalance to the upcoming patriotic First World War centenary services.  The message of pacifism and a steadfast, self-sacrificing morality came through loud and clear.  But was this performance sufficient to resist the established scripts of militancy and peace?  Or did it inadvertently employ the same techniques of ritual masquerade that serve only to reify existing social masks of martyred heroism?  The troubling issue here is whether this was a case of using familiar theatrical patterns to manipulate audience emotions and generate a pre-determined response to political claims.

As an alternative, I want to narrate here another kind of performance, one which was less public but nonetheless compelled the attention of global audiences as it was unfolding.  On November 25, 2013, Kimberly Rivera lay in a hospital bed under armed guard.  She had been transported there from the prison where she was serving her 10-month sentence after her failed CO bid.  Kimberly was not at the hospital becuase of illness or infirmity, but rather to give birth to a child conceived prior to her court martial.  Although she had requested an early release (of 45 days) to prevent her from having to give birth in prison, the proposed curtailment of her sentence was denied.  Her husband Mario was prohibited from witnessing his baby’s birth, and the door to the hospital room was barred by a Staff Seargeant.  Despite this, Michael Kaden Rivera emerged healthily into the world that day, under the watchful eyes of the military guards.  He was almost immediately separated from his mother and placed in his father's custody.  News of the birth spread immediately online, with pleas from pacifist and anti-war organisations to support the Riveras' appeals for Kimberly's early release. (Brock 2013; Meola and McKee 2014)

To my mind, what this scenario reveals is the potential for conscientious objection to unfold in unexpected ways; to break the boundaries of expected storylines, to expand the cast of characters.  This event undeniably contained elements of masquerade, although here the unstoppable demands of a yet-to-be-born creature managed to interrupt the scripts of state power and citizen vulnerability.  This might inspire us to focus, as an aspect of War Masquerade, on those moments when the masked ball is interrupted, when the musical score falters and instead we experience unpredictable but unstoppable forces of life.  In the drama of childbirth Kimberly Rivera's mask slipped, and tiny Michael Kaden claimed centre stage.  Perhaps more importantly, as Kimberly’s own repertoire of masks fell away, the prison authorities surrounding her seemed to fasten their own masks more securely.  What threat did her tiny newborn pose to a cadre of mask-wearers who had imprisoned his mother for refusing to kill?  Is it possible that this moment of fleshed humanity interrupted the search for social drama verisimilitude, and thus posed a threat to the masquerades of military personnel?  
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